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Abstract
I construct a model of the network industry in which an upstream operator provides
essential facilities for downstream operators. Assuming Shapley bargaining over access
charges, I ﬁnd that the main condition for mergers, either vertical or horizontal, to be
beneﬁcial to the merging parties is such that the network industry exhibits decreasing returns
to network size.
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I. Introduction
A typical feature in network industries is that upstream ﬁrms provide essential facilities or
inputs for downstream ﬁrms. Downstream ﬁrms, with access to essential factors, supply ﬁnal
services for end-users. We observe this structure in many network industries such as the
Internet, cable, telecommunications, gas, and electricity industries. Essential bottleneck facili-
ties in the relevant industries are backbones for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), channel
providers for local cable system operators, LECs (Local Exchange Carriers) for long-distance
telecom operators, distribution pipes for local gas suppliers, and transmission grids for local
electricity ﬁrms.
In the paper, I consider the network industry in which one upstream operator supplies
essential facilities for K downstream operators. Assuming Shapley bargaining over access
charges, I examine merger incentives. The main condition for mergers, either vertical or
horizontal, to be beneﬁcial to the merging parties is that the aggregate proﬁt function of a
coalition is concave in the size of the network that the coalition covers, i.e., that the network
industry exhibits decreasing returns to network size. It seems counter-intuitive that decreasing
returns to network size imply merger beneﬁts. However, notice that Shapley bargaining
 The paper was motivated by a co-work with Steve Wildman at Michigan State University. I am very grateful
to his encouragement and discussions. I also appreciate Sang-Seung Yi at Seoul National University for careful
comments. All the remaining errors are mine.
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or integrate. Hence, I consider merger incentives in terms of bargaining advantage, not in
terms of e$ciency gains. I explain the results with two considerations of fair-share and
bargaining-power incorporated in the Shapley value.
Since Shapley (1953) introduced the concept, there have been many theoretical works to
prove its superiority as a bargaining solution concept, e.g., Harsanyi (1977), and Gul (1989).
However, because of the complexity of computing it for large games, the Shapley value has
received few applications in industrial economics. A notable exception is Hart and Moore
(1990). They addressed the issue of the boundary of the ﬁrm in a general set-up, and
considered ex ante relation-speciﬁc investment decisions of ﬁrms as well as ex post Shapley
bargaining. The current paper, focusing only on Shapley bargaining, provides more thorough
characterizations of merger incentives in the speciﬁc context of the network industry. Chipty
and Snyder (1999) also addressed an issue similar to the current paper, a bargaining
motivation for horizontal mergers, in the cable television industry. But, they adopted a
bilateral Nash bargaining solution. Jeon and Wildman (2002) adopted Shapley bargaining
solution to address size e#ects in the cable television industry. This paper extends their work
into a more general set-up of network industries. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) showed that
non-cooperative solution for intra-ﬁrm wage bargaining is consistent with the Shapley value
when the ﬁrm and workers can renegotiate anytime before production. The ﬁrm is regarded as
the provider of essential facilities for workers. They noticed that unionization is desirable from
the workers’ point of view when the production technology is concave. They just illustrated a
numerical example with two employees. The results in this paper may be regarded as
generalizing it in a broader context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II constructs a model of the network industry
with one upstream ﬁrm and K downstream ﬁrms, and explains the nature of Shapley
bargaining over access charges for the essential factor that the upstream ﬁrm provides for
downstream ﬁrms. Section III shows the main results, and provides intuitive explanation.
Section IV illustrates some applications of the model: industries in which Metcalfe’s Law
characterizes network externalities, deregulated local-monopoly industries such as cable
television as in Jeon and Wildman (2002), and intra-ﬁrm bargaining between the ﬁrm and
employees as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Section V concludes by summarizing the results and
discussing their implications and limitations.
II. Model
A network industry is composed of K1 operators: operator 0 provides the essential
facilities or inputs for downstream operator i(1, 2, …,K), which supplies ﬁnal services for
end-users. Figure 1 shows the structure of the network industry.
1 Operator i covers a network
with size ni, and obtains gross proﬁts before the payment of access charges, niu(N), where N
1 The upstream operator may be vertically integrated, and serves its own network with size n0. But, my results
do not depend on whether the essential facility provider is vertically integrated or not. To save notation, I will
assume that the initial state is vertical separation: i.e., n00.
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i1
ni. The size of network may represent the number of end-users (user groups or service
areas). If u(N) represents net beneﬁt per end-user, we expect u (N)0 due to network
externalities. Each downstream operator i pays access charge ai to operator 0.




and operator i’s net proﬁt niu(N)ai (i1, 2, …,K). I do not model explicitly the process
of bargaining that determines access charges. Instead I assume that each obtains its share
according to the Shapley value. Given Shapley values Shi (i0, 1, …., K), access charges ai




ai and Shiniu(N)ai(i1, 2, …,K). (1)
Subsequently, I will focus on determining each operator’s Shapley value.
Denote the grand coalition as I{0, 1, 2, ...., K} and the value function as v(S) for any
partial coalition SI. Any coalition’s value is the aggregate of its members’ proﬁts. The
network structure, speciﬁed as above, simpliﬁes it to a great extent. Due to the nature of
essentiality of operator 0’s facilities, we can reduce the value function as follows:




p(ni1&&nik)SI such as S{0, i1, &&, ik}
where p(n)nu(n).
Notice that p(n) represents the aggregate proﬁt of coalition S with the network size of n.
Obviously, p(0)0, and p (n)0.
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[v(S)v(S\{i})](i0, 1, …., K), (3)
where s and K1 are the sizes of coalitions S and I, respectively. As is well known, the Shapley
values, as deﬁned by (3), can be given the following heuristic interpretation. Suppose that K
1 players line up in a random order. It is assumed that all orders of lining up have the same
probability: viz., 1/(K1)!. Suppose that if a player, i, ﬁnds the members of coalition S\{i}
(and no others) in front of him, he receives the amount v(S)v(S\{i}), i.e., the marginal
amount which he contributes to the coalition, as payo#. Then, Shapley value Shi is the expected
payo# to player i under this randomization scheme.
2
In general, the Shapley values are too complicated to work with when K is large.
However, in the set-up of network industries with essential facilities, we can exploit the































We are interested in merger incentives, i.e., whether two operators i and j can gain by
merging into one. Denote the merged operator by ij, and its share by Shij. Then, we can say
that the merger is beneﬁcial for the merging parties if ShiShjShij. We will consider the










2 This explanation is adapted from Owen (1982, p. 197).
3 To interpret this in terms of the general formula (3), consider i 0a n dS{0, i1,… … ,ik}. The summation is
over all (i1, ....., ik) such that i1&&ik and {i1,… … ,ik}I\{0}.
4 The interpretation here is analogous to that in footnote 3. I.e., consider i 1a n dS{0, 1, i1,… … ,ik}. The
summation is over all (i1, ....., ik) such that i1&&ik and {i1,… … ,ik}I\{0, 1}.
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merger. For the representative case of a horizontal merger between 1 and 2, we can derive










1. Incentives of Vertical Mergers
Suppose that there do not exist dominant downstream operators whose network sizes are
considerably larger than others. More speciﬁcally, consider:




ni 	S, S {1, 2, ..... K}.
In the above, s and sdenote the number of members in coalitions S and S , respectively.
Hence, Assumption 1 means that any coalition with s members has a network size no less than
does any other coalition with s1 members. An extreme version of this assumption is that all
operators have the same size of networks. With Assumption 1, we can establish the following
result.
5
Theorem 1. With Assumption 1, we have: Sh0Sh1Sh01 if p
 (n)0.
Assumption 1 is not always necessary for Theorem 1; it is just a su$cient condition. In fact,
it is not necessary when K2o r3 .
6
Theorem 2.F o rK2 or 3, we have: Sh0Sh1Sh01 if p
 (n)0.
2. Incentives of Horizontal Mergers
For any K, I can establish the following result on the su$cient conditions for a horizontal
merger to be beneﬁcial or not.
Theorem 3. Sh1Sh2Sh12 if p
 (n)0a n dp 
(n)
0.
In case of K2 or 3, we do not need the third-order derivative condition.
Theorem 4.F o rK2 or 3, we have: Sh1Sh2Sh12 if p
 (n)0.
To obtain an intuitive explanation for the results, decompose Shapley value for i of a game
with the set of players, I{0, 1, 2, ...., K}, and the value function, v(S), SI into:
7
5 All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
6 Even in case of K4, I can construct an example which shows that Assumption 1 is not necessary for the
result.
7 See Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 681).














The ﬁrst term in (9) is the equal division among all players, which I call fair-share considera-
tion. The second term in (9), which I call bargaining-power consideration, represents player i’s
bargaining power relative to other players; Shi(I\{k}, v)i si’s share in the absence of k, while
Shk(I\{i}, v)i sk’s share in the absence of i. Mergers reduce the total value of merging parties
because all players share equally the grand coalition outcome in a fair-share consideration of
the Shapley value. On the other hand, mergers will enhance the merging parties’ inﬂuence, and
hence increase their shares in a bargaining-power consideration of the Shapley value.
We may interpret the convexity (concavity) of industry proﬁt function in network size as
increasing (decreasing) returns to network size. Then, our results read that mergers are costly
(beneﬁcial) when returns to network size are increasing (decreasing). Why do increasing
returns to network size lead to unproﬁtable mergers? Recall that in Shapley bargaining,
fair-share consideration favors separation, while bargaining-power consideration favors
merger. A noticeable feature in decomposition (9) is that the former is based on the grand
coalition outcome, and the latter is determined according to outcomes of various partial
coalitions. Hence, the former consideration based on the grand coalition outcome can be more
important than the latter consideration based on partial coalitions’ outcomes when there exist
increasing returns to network size.
I emphasize that I adopt a cooperative approach of the Shapley value in addressing
merger incentives. E$ciency is always achieved whether ﬁrms are integrated or separated.
Hence, in comparison with separated ﬁrms, integrated ﬁrms cannot take advantage of
additional e$ciencies due to economies of scale or scope. The above results imply that in case
of increasing returns to network size, mergers are rather costly to the merging parties in terms
of Shapley bargaining.
IV. Applications
In this section, I provide some applications of the model that show its relevance.
1. Metcalfe’s Law
Metcalfe’s Law, named after Robert N. Metcalfe, co-inventor of Ethernet, states that the
value of a network, deﬁned as its utility to a population, grows with the square of the number
of its users.
8 It seems to be mostly relevant to communication networks, where the value of a
network depends on the number of possible connections between its members or nodes. Given
the network size of n, each member can connect to (n1) other members, and the total
number of two-way connections is nC22n(n1). Suppose that network externalities obey
a weak version of Metcalfe’s Law such as u(n)n1; each consumer’s beneﬁts of subscribing
to a network depend on the number of his own connections to other members. Then, with the
deﬁnition of p(n), we have:
8 Refer to Newton (2001, p.436)
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2n, p (n)0, p (n)0.
That is, Metcalfe’s Law implies that the network industry shows increasing returns to network
size.
Moreover, if network externalities obey a strong version of Metcalfe’s Law such as u(n)
(n1)bn(n1)(0b1); each subscriber beneﬁts from other members’ communica-




2), p (n)0, p (n)0.
The results in the paper suggest that operators do not beneﬁt from mergers, either vertical or
horizontal, in terms of Shapley bargaining outcome.
2. Cable Television Industry
Another application of the model, which actually motivated this work, is bargaining
between programming network and multi-system operators in the cable industry.
9 In this
context, upstream operator 0 is a programming network, and downstream operator i is a
system operator with ni local franchises. Each franchise unit has the following identical
demand function:
QQ(P, B), Q10, Q20,
where Q denotes the number of subscribers in the franchise unit, P is subscription fee, and B
represents network’s expenditure on programming. The increase in network’s budget in
programming boosts up subscription demand, while the increase in subscription fee dampens
it. System operators receive subscription fee P, and incur cost c, per subscriber. Hence,
downstream operator i obtains net revenues from subscribers in their respective franchises,
ni(Pc)Q(P, B). On the other hand, they pay programming fees ai to network 0. Therefore,
downstream operator i’s net proﬁts are ni(Pc)Q(P, B)ai(i1, 2, …,K). The upstream
programming network, network 0, has two sources: revenues from system operators, and
revenues from advertisers. I assume that advertising revenues are proportional to the total
number of subscribers who have access to the network with r per each subscriber. Firm 0




2 recapitulates the industry structure and income ﬂows. Given P and B, ai’s are determined
according to the Shapley value.
Notice that network 0 is essential for any coalition in producing positive value. The value




where nni1....nik, R(P, B)(Prc)Q(P, B).
I assume that the second-order su$cient conditions for program (10) hold true:
R110, R220, R11R22R12
20. (11)
9 For the detailed discussions, see Jeon and Wildman (2002).
H=6EA:N 76G<6>C>C< 6C9 B:G<:G >C8:CI>K:H >C C:ILDG@ >C9JHIG>:H L>I= :HH:CI>6A 2006] ,-/Then, the optimal solutions in the above maximization program, which I will denote by P(n)
and B(n), satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
R1(P(n), B(n))0, nR2(P(n), B(n))1. (12)
Notice that the value of coalition S{0, i1, &&, ik} critically depends upon its network size n
ni1&&nik. That is, given P(n)a n dB(n) by (12), the value of a coalition with network size
n can be expressed as:
v(S)p(n)nR(P(n), B(n))B(n). (13)
This may have the same interpretation of the aggregate proﬁts of an industry with network size
n as in (2)
Now I can show the convexity of p(n), i.e., p (n)0. By the envelope theorem, we have:
dp
dn






























In the context of bargaining between the programming network and multi-system
operators in the cable industry, I showed that the industry proﬁt function features increasing
returns to network size. Again, this suggests that operators do not beneﬁt from mergers, either
F><.2 . C 67A: IC9JHIGN SIGJ8IJG:
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Shapley bargaining is concerned, ﬁrms tend to separate rather than integrate.
3. Wage Bargaining in the Firm
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) considered an intraﬁrm bargaining game where employees and
the ﬁrm engage in wage negotiations. They showed that when contracts cannot bind employees
to the ﬁrm, the resulting stable wage and proﬁt proﬁles are equivalent to the Shapley values to
a corresponding cooperative game. Since the ﬁrm possesses the essential capital assets with
which employees to work, we can reinterpret the current model to address wage bargaining in
the ﬁrm.
Suppose that ﬁrm 0 employs K workers, produces p(K), and pays worker i wage wi(i1,




wi and Shiwi(i1, 2, …, K).
The characteristic value function of the corresponding cooperative game is:
v(S)0 SI such as 0

S.
v(S)p(k) SI such as S{0, i1, &&, ik}.
Hence, this application reduces formally to the special case of the current model with:
ni1 i1, ….., K.






























Notice that this characterization of the proﬁt and wage proﬁles is equivalent to that of Stole
and Zwiebel (1996, p.199). Especially, the wage in (15) depends upon the weighted average of
marginal products, with increasing weight in the wage expression the closer to the margin.
Given the same total output, employees prefer a convex production technology, while the
ﬁrm prefers a concave technology. It is because the more concave a production technology, the
more front-loaded marginal products and the less the work’s share (the greater the ﬁrm’s
share). Unionization has the e#ect of linearizing production technology by making two
H=6EA:N 76G<6>C>C< 6C9 B:G<:G >C8:CI>K:H >C C:ILDG@ >C9JHIG>:H L>I= :HH:CI>6A 2006] ,-1changing marginal products into a single constant marginal product. Therefore, given decreas-
ing marginal products, employees can cash in on the linearizing e#ect of unionization. Stole
and Zwiebel (1996, p.211) constructed a simple numerical example with K2 to illustrate the
relationship between unionization and the concavity of production technology.
The results of the current paper on incentives of horizontal mergers generalize their result
on employees’ preference over unionization. Moreover, we may interpret the incentives of
vertical mergers as the ﬁrm’s preference over partnership with a group of workers. Inciden-
tally, employees’ preference over unionization and the ﬁrm’s preference over partnership with
a group of workers coincide. That is, when a production technology exhibits decreasing
returns, the ﬁrm and a union compete to coalesce with a non-unionized group of workers.
V. Conclusion
In the paper, adopting the Shapley bargaining approach, I addressed merger incentives in
network industries with essential facilities. We expect that ﬁrms beneﬁt from mergers when
there exist increasing returns to scale or scope. However, I obtained seemingly contrary results
whose main implication is that ﬁrms are worse o# from mergers when aggregate proﬁts of
integrating parties exhibit increasing returns to network size. It is due to the nature of Shapley
bargaining, where ﬁrms cooperate to exploit all the e$ciencies regardless of merger decisions.
In case of mergers, mergers reduce the total value of merging parties because all players share
equally the grand coalition outcome in a fair-share consideration of the Shapley value. On the
other hand, mergers will lift up the merged parties’ inﬂuence, and hence increase their shares
in a bargaining-power consideration of the Shapley value. The costs of mergers due to the
fair-share consideration become more prominent than the beneﬁts of mergers due to the
bargaining-power consideration when there exist increasing returns to network size. This is
because the fair-share consideration is based on the grand coalition outcome, while the
bargaining-power consideration is based on partial coalition outcomes.
When the value of a network grows with the square of the number of users, as Metcalfe’s
Law states, the network industry exhibits increasing returns to network size. Moreover, I
showed that the industry structure of the cable industry is well ﬁt into the model, and that the
cable industry has the feature of increasing returns. These facts imply that ﬁrms tend to
separate rather than merge as far as Shapley bargaining is concerned. Therefore, if we observe
mergers in these network industries with increasing returns, we may infer that there must be
merger beneﬁts due to the enhancement of e$ciency or monopoly power other than the
bargaining advantage considered in this work.
Admittedly, the current work has several limitations. First, there are other important
determinants of the boundary of the ﬁrm, e.g., economies of scale or scope, monopoly power,
and relation-speciﬁc investment. The paper, abstracting from all the other determinants,
conﬁnes narrowly to bargaining beneﬁts or costs as a determinant of the limit of the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrst line of extension is to incorporate other elements into the model. Second, the Shapley
value is one of many bargaining solution concepts even though it has been given many
justiﬁcations. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to check whether the results in the paper are robust
to other bargaining solution concepts, either cooperative or noncooperative. Third, the cable
industry was taken as an example for the network industry with essential facilities. Many other
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,-2industries, such as the Internet, telecommunications, gas, and electricity, have the features that
are assumed in the model. Attempts to extend this work to capture other interesting elements
in these industries also await future research.
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Notice that (19.4) is just a reformulation of (19.3). In order to avoid duplication, kKk
1, i.e., k K1
2
. The same holds true for (19.7) and (19.8)
We can check that the coe$cients of (19.1) and (19.10) are equivalent. Similarly, notice
that the coe$cients of (19.2) and (19.9), those of (19.3) and (19.8), those of (19.4) and
(19.7), and those of (19.5) and (19.6) are equivalent pair-wise. To conﬁrm the equivalence in
general terms, consider two sequences that are composed of terms in equation (19) —t he ﬁrst
sequence of (19.1) through (19.5) and the second sequence of (19.6) through (19.10); each
one is composed of (K-1) elements. The k-th term from the top of the ﬁrst sequence is (19.3),
H=6EA:N 76G<6>C>C< 6C9 B:G<:G >C8:CI>K:H >C C:ILDG@ >C9JHIG>:H L>I= :HH:CI>6A 2006] ,.+while the k-th term from the bottom of the second sequence is (19.8). The coe$cients of
(19.3) and (19.8) are the same as (K12k)
(Kk)!(k1)!
(K1)!
. On the other hand, the (k
1)-th term from the bottom of the ﬁrst sequence is (19.4), while the (k1)-th term from the











































Notice again, in oder to avoid duplication, kKk1, i.e., k K1
2
in (20.3) and (20.4).



















Now we can show that if Assumption 1 holds true,
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,.,{p(ni1&nik1)p(Nni1&nik1)}
{p(n1ni1&nik1)p(Nn1ni1&nik1)}
 0i fp (n) 0 (22)
for any k K1
2
and for any (i1, ....., ik1) such that i1.....ik1 and {i1, ....., ik1}I , and









Since the number of members in S{1, 2, …, K}\{i1, ....., ik1}i ssKk1 and that in S
{1, i1, ....., ik1}i ss k,w ek n o ws	sfor any k K1
2








10 Therefore, from expression (23), we know that (22)
holds true for k K1
2
. Moreover, it holds true with strict inequality for k1. It is because
M0a n dN2Mn1	0 when k1. Therefore, Sh0Sh1Sh01 in (21) is greater (less)
than 0 when p(n) is convex (concave). This proves Theorem 1. Q.E.D.






















This proves Theorem 2. Q.E.D.












10 Since n1 is cancelled out in N2Mn1, the proof holds true for any n1. That is, as far as the size of n1 is
concerned, Assumption 1 should not be restrictive. However, Theorem 1 is not just for merging between 0 and 1.
Hence, I state Assumption 1 in general terms.
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Incidentally, the coe$cients of (27.1) and (27.2) are the same in terms of absolute value, and
their signs are opposite. Moreover, the coe$cients of (27.3), (27.4) and (27.5) are the same
in terms of absolute value, and the signs of (27.3) and (27.4) are the opposite of (27.5). We
can state similarly for (27.9), (27.10) and (27.11). We can check the conformity of coe$cients



























Notice a symmetric relationship among coe$cients qK()’s in (29), i.e.,
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where the summation in the above covers k1 through kK3, and the last term is for k
K2 in (29).








Now, notice that if k K3
2
, then Kk3k and K2CKk3K2Ck. From these facts, we
know that for any {j1, &&, jk}Isuch that j1&&jk, there exist at least one {i1, &&, iKk3}
Isuch that i1&&iKk3 and {j1, &&, jk}{i1, &&, iKk3}. This implies that YK(k) in (31)






The number of this kind of terms in YK(k) of (31) is K2Ck. On the other hand, the second




The number of this kind of terms in YK(k) of (31) is K2CKk3K2CK. Notice that we can















Hence, we know that y10i fp (n)0, and that y20i fp (n)0. Therefore, for any k
K3
2
, YK(k)0i fp (n) 0a n dp (n)0. This proves Theorem 3. Q.E.D.






















This proves Theorem 4. Q.E.D.
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